Lawmakers Slash NASA Budget Request

Especially worrying since everyone else is stepping up in the manned spaceflight department - China even has a Mars probe in the pipeline for later this year.

From Space.com:

Move called a ‘time-out’ as White House awaits review of post-shuttle plans.

WASHINGTON - In a move that reflects the uncertainty surrounding NASA's current strategy for replacing the space shuttle and returning astronauts to the moon by 2020, House appropriators slashed by 16 percent the space agency's $4 billion request for manned space exploration in 2010.




The proposed legislation, marked up June 4 by the House Appropriations commerce, justice, science subcommittee, trims $483 million overall from U.S. President Barack Obama's $18.7 billion budget request for NASA next year. The $670 million cut to the 2010 manned exploration request would leave $3.21 billion, which is less than is available for the effort this year.

Rep. Alan Mollohan (D-W.Va.), the subcommittee's chairman, described the move as a "time-out" in the budget process as the White House awaits the findings of a 10-member panel tasked by the White House to reassess NASA's post-shuttle exploration plans. That panel, led by former Lockheed Martin chief Norm Augustine, is expected to report back with its findings in August.



In his opening statement at the markup hearing, Mollohan said the cut should not be viewed as a diminution of the subcommittee's support for NASA's human spaceflight activities. "Rather, it's a deferral taken without prejudice; it is a pause, a time-out, to allow the president to establish his vision for human space exploration and to commit to realistic future funding levels to realize this vision."

Mollohan told Space News June 4 he is "open to responding to an amended budget request" based on Augustine's review. Mollohan also said he expects the Obama administration to deliver to Congress a "realistic and sustainable" cost assessment of NASA's human spaceflight program in time to amend the 2010 request.

"We invite this report and the administration's response to it, whatever it is," Mollohan said. "We want very much for the funding to be an honest and realistic cost assessment."

Concerns raised
NASA's current human spaceflight plan calls for retiring the space shuttle in 2010 and replacing it with a crew capsule dubbed Orion that would be launched atop a shuttle-derived rocket, the Ares-1, starting in 2015. At the president's request, Augustine's panel is taking a second look at this plan, along with NASA's strategy for returning astronauts to the Moon by 2020, given the likely available budgets over the next several years.

During the hearing, key Republicans expressed concern that the bill would hold NASA's funding next year to 2009 levels. In a June 4 statement Rep. Robert Aderholt (R-Ala.), said he was joining colleagues "in expressing my strong support for increasing this funding as we continue the Fiscal Year 2010 bill process."

Aderholt specifically named fellow Republican Reps. Jerry Lewis of California, the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee; Frank Wolf of Virginia, the ranking member of the commerce, justice, science subcommittee; and John Culberson of Texas.

Other recommendations contained in the bill include a $77million reduction in NASA's proposed space operations budget, which includes the space shuttle and international space station; a $6 million reduction in science; and a $332 million shift in funds from the Cross Agency Support account to a new budget line-item included in the subcommittee's mark. Dubbed Construction and Environmental Compliance, the new account would be funded at $441 million. Congressional aides said the new line item and accompanying funds are aimed at consolidating NASA's various construction efforts into a single pot of money.

Following the markup, the subcommittee posted on its Web site an exhaustive list of earmarks sought by its members. According to the document, money tapped for NASA earmarks totaled close to $15 million.

While increasing NASA's topline funding figure over 2009, Obama's 2010 funding request included an out-year budget profile for the space agency that is some $3 billion lower than was anticipated at this time last year.

Paul Shawcross, chief of the science and space branch in the White House Office of Management and Budget, said the administration's commitment to NASA was evident in the 2009 stimulus package — which included $1 billion for NASA programs — as well as in its 2010 budget request.

"But after 2010, it's flat to 2013," Shawcross said June 2 during a symposium hosted by the George Washington University here. He attributed the flat funding profile to the recession and anticipated recovery measures. He said the Obama administration is facing a $1.26 trillion deficit in 2010, a figure the president hopes to reduce to about $500 billion by 2014. Consequently, funding for NASA and other discretionary spending will be squeezed in the out-years.

"That fiscal environment is reflected in NASA's topline request," Shawcross said.

Meanwhile, W. Michael Hawes, associate NASA administrator for program analysis and evaluation — who is charged with leading the agency team that will provide technical and analytic support to the Augustine panel — said the blue-ribbon commission's work is under way.

"We're starting to get questions from the panel, and we'll be doing a series of fact-finding telecons, site visits, public meetings," he told the symposium audience. Hawes said one area on which the panel will focus is the role international cooperation plays in U.S. manned spaceflight. He said the panel would hear from four international space station partners as part of the review process.

Damon Wells, senior policy analyst in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, said pursuing international relationships is a key aspect of space policy. "The panel has been explicitly asked to look at international cooperation," Wells told the audience. "It is part of the dialogue."



Hawes told Space News June 2 that the panel would not have time to produce an interim report, though the committee expects to brief the White House on its findings mid-August. The committee's final report is expected at the end of that month. The Augustine panel's first public meeting is slated for June 17.

Other speakers at the symposium questioned whether the Augustine panel has been granted sufficient time to do its work.

Marcia Smith, president of the Space and Technology Policy Group, a consultancy here, said the Augustine panel would provide little more than a snapshot in time given its deadline.

"Not everyone agrees on the mandated timing," she said. "Congress, in particular, wants it not to be constrained."

Jeffery Bingham, a member of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee's Republican staff and senior adviser on space and aeronautics, agreed.

"I am worried about the time they have, and the resources they have," he told the audience. "It's going to be dicey."

Bingham expressed concern that Augustine was told to limit the options his panel is to present to the administration.

"We think it prejudges the outcome," he said. "We want to see that it is wide open and that all options are on the table."

Richard Obermann, staff director for the House Science and Technology space and aeronautics subcommittee, said lawmakers are encouraged by the additional funds for NASA programs in the 2009 stimulus package and the 2010 budget request. But Obermann expressed "uncertainty with the new administration's intentions," particularly in the out-years, where NASA's topline funding is flat.

Oberman said increases in other parts of NASA's budget, including aeronautics and Earth science, came at the expense of out-year funding for space exploration. Obermann said he sees NASA's current funding projections for 2010-2014 as a placeholder, and that he expects the Augustine panel's review to influence funding for the space agency's exploration programs in the out-year timeframe. Obermann said he was encouraged by the choice of Augustine to lead the human spaceflight review, noting testimony Augustine gave before the House Science and Technology Committee in 2004, shortly after former President George W. Bush announced plans to replace the space shuttle and return astronauts to the Moon.

At that time Augustine said manned space exploration offered many benefits, but that "it would be a grave mistake to try to pursue a space program on the cheap. To do so is in my opinion an invitation to disaster. There is a tendency in any can-do organization to believe that it can operate with almost any budget that is made available. The fact is that trying to do so is a mistake — particularly when safety is a major consideration."

Read more...

NASA Authorization Bill Enacted

HR 6063, aka the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008, was signed into law by President Bush on Friday, 17 October 2008.  HR 6063 is not a full appropriations bill.  Rather it is a statement of declared intentions for NASA and sets upper limits for FY 2009, to the tune of $20.2 billion.  However, Congress is not likely to award this full amount.  The bill includes an additional $1 billion to speed Ares development.  

Notable parts of the bill include a "Reaffirmation of Exploration Policy," which sets out for the next Administration Congress's support for the VSE.  Also, the section entitled "Stepping Stone Approach to Exploration" mandates that future Administrators are to consider future use in exploring other celestial bodies when designing lunar architecture.

Congress also mandates that "The Administrator shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the International Space Station remains a viable and productive facility capable of potential United States utilization through at least 2020 and shall take no steps that would preclude its continued operation and utilization by the United States after 2015."

Addressing the life of the Space Shuttle, NASA is required to fly its established schedule plus one flight to life the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer to the ISS.  NASA is also prohibited from taking any actions that would make it impossible to fly the Shuttle after 2010 if the new President decides he wants to extend the Program, but Congress also states that by having that sections, they are not endorsing an extension of the program.  NASA has 120 from enactment of the bill to provide Congress with a report that "outlin[es] options, impacts, and associated costs of ensuring the safe and effective operation of the Space Shuttle at the minimum rate necessary to support International Space Station operations and resupply."

Read more...

NASA Science Mission Directorate Cost Overrun Coverup

Freom Spaceref.com:

Last year, before Ed Weiler came back to NASA Headquarters to be the Associate Administrator for NASA's Science Mission Directorate, an internal cost study was done to see how much SMD overruns every year on its various projects and missions. That study showed $5.4 billion of cost increases over a 4 year period. The goal posts for this study involved measuring costs starting from either the cost contained in the FY 2005 budget or, if the project started later, from its Phase B cost. The costing period then extended forward to the amount that it had increased to for the FY 2009 budget submission. 

This large lump of overruns did not sit well with Ed Weiler, so he decided to order folks to make it go away. How to do it? Simple: just move the goal posts. In so doing, you use Congressional guidance (Nunn-McCurdy) as a smoke screen to hide the true magnitude of cost increases. 

According to sources inside SMD at NASA Headquarters, Weiler's approach was to forget the numbers that NASA and the scientific community originally bought into when missions were agreed to. Instead, Weiler directed that SMD now use the numbers that arose down the road - after a mission had reached Phases C/D - and then to look at cost growth from that point forward to FY 2009 budget. In other words, Weiler decided to pick numbers that were "more mature" as a starting point.  

Of course, this approach resulted in a smaller number since the growth from buy-in to Phase C/D was "forgotten". Weiler also ignored additional costs that were incurred to enhance scientific return and other factors deemed beyond the scope of NASA's responsibility. The new number? Only $1.5 billion in cost increases over 4 years as opposed to the earlier $5.4 billion figure. 

Sounds much better that way, right? Alas, this is simply another example whereby NASA cooked the books to make a bad situation look less bad. 

Of course, in his defense, Weiler will say that he used metrics and thresholds specified by Nunn-McCurdy. Congress may direct NASA to look at numbers and cost growth that way, but this approach simply does not cover the actual cost growth that has occurred from the original number NASA bought into to start with. 

One example is the game being played with real cost of the Mars Science Laboratory. MSL's cost has gone from an inital $650 million (recommended in the Decadal Survey as a "medium cost category" mission) up to the current estimate of over $2 billion. If you use the Nunn-McCurdy goal posts you do not start to track cost increases at the initial $650 million buy-in figure, but rather you start counting at the level that $650 million grew to i.e. $1.4 billion. 

When you move the goal posts to this new point, $750 million in cost growth just disappears. This way, NASA can cite Nunn-Mcurdy and say "it is a 30% increase from $1.4 billion up to $2 billion". NASA can now ignore the cost growth from $650 million up to $1.4 billion as if it never happened. 

But things have been getting so bad on MSL that even this approach cannot completely hide a serious (and growing) cost problem - one that threatens the vitality of NASA's entire planetary exploration program. 

In the end, the process of sweeping these cost increases under the rug means that the taxpayers get cheated out of the full story as to how the cost grew on this mission. The truth is obvious: NASA does not want them to know. 

 Editor's update: in a telecon with reporters today, a telecon that was supposed to discuss “technical and budget issues” on MSL, NASA personnel more or less avoided providing any specific budget news and tried to shift the discussion back to technical issues. 

Ed Weiler stated that his team had a third meeting with NASA Administrator Griffin to discuss MSL. We said that NASA has "made significant technical progress since the May meeting" and "we are heading toward a March 2009 launch". 

When asked to come up with a cost impact for current issues, Weiler said "we do not have exact numbers" and that NASA has "no exact estimate from JPL. We are going our own analysis." When pressed for exact numbers, Weiler said "I am not at liberty to pass out numbers." 

The MSL cost increase was described as being from an estimate of $1.6 billion in August 2006 to an estimated $1.9 billion today. 

When asked if funds will be needed and where they would come form, Weiler said "When we know the final cost in 2009 we'll first look within the Mars program and then outside the program." He noted that there are some cost phasing techniques that can allow resources to be freed up. 

When asked again to described what the final cost for MSL would be, Weiler said that "those numbers are being developed. We'll work with OMB and Capitol Hill. It is clear that funding is needed if we go in 2009." 

When asked to comment on why an initial MSL cost number of $1.6 billion was used as a basis to calculate cost overruns and not the original $650 million buy in figure, Weiler said "the way NASA accounts to Congress - the cost that NASA commits to - is the cost that NASA buys into - is at Phase C. You do not understand the cost of a mission until Phase C and that is what we have to report to Congress and that is What Doug is correctly quoting." 

P.S. If you want to see another example of where NASA constantly changes the cost of a mission, but never admits the true cost, have a look at these posts regarding the Mars Phoenix Mission. Not only did the cost change virtually every time NASA talked about it, they only admitted $100 million that had not been included this year when I pushed the issue. NASA then continued to use an old and inaccurate cost whenever they talked about the mission. Why should anyone believe any cost numbers coming out of NASA?

Why Does The Official Cost of Mars Phoenix Keep Changing?

The Actual Cost of Mars Phoenix is $520 Million

Read more...

Statement of Administration Policy

Direct from the bean counters in the President's Office of Management and Budget, I have found a small document stating the outgoing Administration's opposition to H.R. 6063 because it "mandates specific Space Shuttle flights that greatly threaten NASA’s ability to retire the Shuttle in 2010, an action that is critical to implementing the President’s Vision for Space Exploration."

Here is the actual pdf.

And this is the text of HR 6063.

June 10, 2008 (House Rules)
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY
H.R. 6063 – National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2008
(Rep. Udall (D) Colorado and 7 cosponsors)
The Administration supports maintaining a strong national civil space science and aeronautics enterprise and is committed to advancing the quest for new knowledge, discovery, and exploration that is embodied in NASA programs and activities. However, the Administration strongly opposes H.R. 6063 because it mandates specific Space Shuttle flights that greatly threaten NASA’s ability to retire the Shuttle in 2010, an action that is critical to implementing the President’s Vision for Space Exploration. In addition, the Administration has other serious objections to several provisions of H.R. 6063 that must be satisfactorily addressed prior to final congressional action on reauthorization legislation.
The bill contains provisions that mandate two contingency logistics flights and an additional Shuttle flight for the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer and require that these flights take place before Shuttle retirement, thus effectively superseding the 2010 Shuttle retirement date that is a critical step to enabling successful development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle as called for by the President’s Vision for Space Exploration. Consistent with the Vision, the current Space Shuttle flight manifest is a measured and carefully balanced plan to allow the completion of the International Space Station (ISS), a safe and orderly retirement of the Shuttle, and the smooth transition of facilities and personnel to Exploration Systems programs by September 2010. The direction in this section would almost certainly result in several serious impacts and risks to NASA’s exploration programs and other activities, including: (1) significantly increasing costs of the Shuttle program, not including potential recertification activities; (2) delaying the operational capability of the Orion CEV well beyond its current projected dates; (3) exacerbating transition challenges, including facilities and workforce; and (4) exposing astronaut crews to increased risks. In addition, statutorily mandating additional flights regardless of safety assessments and costs sets a dangerous and unwise precedent.
The Space Shuttle must be retired by the end of 2010, and the NASA Administrator’s authority to make the final determination on Shuttle flights based on safety considerations must be preserved. In addition, any increased cost of an additional Shuttle flight must be satisfactorily accommodated within the President’s proposed discretionary spending total.
The FY 2009 budget request of $17.6 billion is sufficient to achieve NASA’s goals, and the additional $2.6 billion authorized in the bill above the President’s request is inconsistent with the Administration’s fiscal policies. Accordingly, the Administration opposes this increased authorization level.
In addition, H.R. 6063 directs several specific activities under the assumption that additional funding will be appropriated, making it likely they will become unfunded
mandates. Directing activities in this manner would severely disrupt the budgets for NASA’s ongoing, carefully-balanced programs and Centers linked to other high-priority goals and activities. For this reason and in view of associated problematic policy implications, the following requirements should either be removed from the bill or appropriately modified: (1) carrying out an additional procurement for Commercial Orbital Transfer Services (COTS) crew capabilities, and mandating that NASA purchase commercial services regardless of cost; (2) establishing an Exploration-related technology research and development program that would draw funding away from the Orion CEV, delaying its availability; (3) establishing a cross-cutting technology development program within the Science Mission Directorate at a level of five percent of the Directorate’s budget; (4) requiring the continued operation and utilization of the ISS by the United States after 2016, without first mitigating significant budget implications in the outyears; and (5) prescribing specific roles and responsibilities regarding NASA’s work with various advisory and external review committees and other Federal agencies that the Administration believes would be problematic and duplicative of already well-established roles and responsibilities.
The Administration also is concerned with the proposed wording of certain provisions and strongly urges that these provisions be modified before passage of the bill. For example, the direction in the bill to limit NASA’s ability to dispose of Space Shuttle-related hardware is likely to severely disrupt ongoing Shuttle retirement and transition activities. Similarly, the specific wording of other provisions in H.R. 6063, including requiring all space observatories to be serviceable regardless of practicality; overly-prescribed aeronautics research goals; and unproductive astronaut health surveys could lead to serious unintended consequences, including greatly increased costs to carry out these mandates. The Administration calls on Congress to modify these provisions to provide NASA sufficient flexibility to make programmatic and management decisions as necessary.
In addition, the bill directs NASA to initiate discussions with foreign nations on "space traffic management." This provision directly infringes upon the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs. The United States already actively promotes international cooperation to enhance spaceflight safety and supports consideration of voluntary transparency and confidence building measures in appropriate venues under the leadership of the Department of State, with appropriate assistance from the Department of Defense. These provisions accordingly should be removed. A similar objectionable provision is contained in the bill’s section governing "exploration crew rescue."
Finally, in addition to the significant concerns highlighted above that must be satisfactorily addressed prior to final congressional action, the Administration has an overarching concern about the highly prescriptive nature of the bill and the significant number of reports and studies that this legislation would require. The Administration understands the need for timely information for Congress to conduct its oversight responsibilities; however, the burden that would be placed on various agencies of the Executive Branch, including NASA, is of concern. The Administration looks forward to working with Congress to modify these aspects of the bill.

Read more...